加沙地區：是是非非
Dec 30th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Israel was provoked, but as in Lebanon in 2006 it may find this war a hard one to end, or to justify
盛怒的以色列發動了新一輪巴以戰爭，但一如2006年的黎以戰爭：最難的問題在於如何收場或者為戰爭辯解。
THE scale and ferocity of the onslaught on Gaza have been shocking, and the television images of civilian suffering wrench the heart. But however deplorable, Israel』s resort to military means to silence the rockets of Hamas should have been no surprise. This war has been a long time in the making.
目前加沙戰爭的殘暴程度令人震驚，電視新聞上滿是令人心悸的苦難平民形象。儘管以色列的決定令人遺憾，但其動用武力讓哈馬斯火箭彈銷聲匿跡的方式卻也在意料之中。長期以來巴以戰爭一直沒有間斷。
Since Israel evacuated its soldiers and settlers from the Gaza Strip three years ago, Palestinian groups in Gaza have fired thousands of rudimentary rockets and mortar bombs across the border, killing very few people but disrupting normal life in a swathe of southern Israel. They fired almost 300 between December 19th, when Hamas ignored Egypt』s entreaties and decided not to renew a six-month truce, and December 27th, when Israel started its bombing campaign (see article). To that extent, Israel is right to say it was provoked.
自從3年前以色列從加沙地帶撤走了軍隊和定居者後，該地區的巴勒斯坦組織已經向邊境的另一邊發射了數以千計的自製火箭彈和迫擊炮；雖然沒有造成過多的人員 傷亡，不過卻極度干擾了以色列南部地區本已很緊張的正常生活。12月19日，哈馬斯對埃及的請求視而不見，拒絕續簽為期60天的停火協議；從那時開始到 12月27日以色列開始空襲以前，巴勒斯坦幾乎發射了超過300枚火箭彈。從這個角度來說，以色列理所應當被激怒。
Of provocation and proportion
挑釁與平衡
It is easy to point out from afar that barely a dozen Israelis had been killed by Palestinian rockets since the Gaza withdrawal. But few governments facing an election, as Israel』s is, would let their towns be peppered every day with rockets, no matter how ineffective. As Barack Obama said on a visit to one Israeli town in July, 「If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I』m going to do everything in my power to stop that. And I would expect Israelis to do the same thing.」 In recent months, moreover, Hamas has smuggled far more lethal rockets into its Gaza enclave, some of which are now landing in Israeli cities that were previously out of range. On its border with Lebanon, Israel already faces one radical non-state actor, Hizbullah, that is formally dedicated to Israel』s destruction and has a powerful arsenal of Iranian-supplied missiles at its disposal. The Israelis are understandably reluctant to let a similar danger grow in Gaza.
自以色列從加沙地區撤離後，一個事實顯而易見：死於巴勒斯坦火箭彈襲擊的以色列人超不過一打。目前以色列正面臨選舉，儘管哈馬斯的襲擊效率低下，在這種情 況下沒有任何政府會讓自己的城池每天都受到火箭彈的連續打擊。就像奧巴馬7月份訪問以色列一個小鎮時說的那樣「如果有人膽敢在我兩個女兒熟睡的時候往我家 裡發射火箭彈，我會竭盡所能制止他。我希望以色列方面會有同樣的想法。」最近數月間，哈馬斯向加沙飛地偷運了更多的大殺傷力火箭彈，其中的一些可以突破以 前襲擊的射程，落在以色列腹地的城鎮。在黎以邊境，以色列正面對著黎巴嫩真主黨這個激進的無政府組織；該組織致力於摧毀以色列，並且擁有強大的軍火庫，裝 備了伊朗提供的導彈。以色列人當然不希望同樣的危險也發生在加沙地區。
And yet Israel should not be surprised by the torrent of indignation it has aroused from around the world. This is not just because people seldom back the side with the F-16s. In general, a war must pass three tests to be justified. A country must first have exhausted all other means of defending itself. The attack should be proportionate to the objective. And it must stand a reasonable chance of achieving its goal. On all three of these tests Israel is on shakier ground than it cares to admit.
以色列在全球範圍內引發了大量責難，當然它自己不會覺得意外：世人很少會支持擁有F16戰機的一方。總體來說，一場戰爭需要符合三個標準才能被證明合法： 首先，一個國家必須悉數使用了所有其他的自衛手段；其次，襲擊的力度要與防衛目的成比例；第三，戰爭的實施必須有達到防衛目的的可能性。用這三個標準來衡 量巴以戰爭的話，以色列方面的根據並不像他們之前宣稱的那樣有利。
It is true that Israel has put up with the rockets from Gaza for a long time. But it may have been able to stop the rockets another way. For it is not quite true that Israel』s only demand in respect of Gaza has been for quiet along the border. Israel has also been trying to undermine Hamas by clamping an economic blockade on Gaza, while boosting the economy of the West Bank, where the Palestinians』 more pliant secular movement, Fatah, holds sway. Even during the now-lapsed truce, Israel prevented all but a trickle of humanitarian aid from entering the strip. So although Israel was provoked, Hamas can claim that it was provoked too. If Israel had ended the blockade, Hamas may have renewed the truce. Indeed, on one reading of its motives, Hamas resumed fire to force Israel into a new truce on terms that would include opening the border.
長久以來，以色列對來自加沙地區的火箭彈襲擊確實採取了容忍態度，不過應該可以找到其他方式來阻止火箭彈襲擊。以色列對加沙地區的訴求不光是邊境線的安 寧，在推動河西岸經濟的同時還試圖通過封鎖的方式來削弱哈馬斯在加沙地區的實力，而在河西岸地區掌舵的是巴勒斯坦的溫和運動派——法塔赫。即使在目前的停 火階段，以色列方面還是保持著對加沙地區的封鎖，僅為人道救援保留了必要的通道。所以雖然以色列宣佈自己被激怒，哈馬斯方面可以表達同樣的態度。如果以色 列方面可以終止封鎖，哈馬斯也許可以續簽停火協議。實際上沒有人瞭解到哈馬斯的動機，該組織重新發動襲擊，意圖迫使以色列在同意開放邊境的條件下進入新一 輪的停火協議。
On proportionality, the numbers speak for themselves—up to a point. After the first three days, some 350 Palestinians had been killed and only four Israelis. Neither common sense nor the laws of war require Israel to deviate from the usual rule, which is to kill as many enemies as you can and avoid casualties on your own side. Hamas was foolish to pick this uneven fight. But of the Palestinian dead, several score were civilians, and many others were policemen rather than combatants. Although both Western armies and their foes have killed far more civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel』s interest should be to minimise the killing. The Palestinians it is bombing today will be its neighbours for ever.
在平衡性方面，數字在某種程度上說明了一切。大約350個巴勒斯坦人死於最初3天的空襲；而以色列方面只有4人死亡。無論戰爭法還是常識都不希望以色列方 面背離通用規則：在避免己方死傷的情況下盡可能多的殺傷敵人。哈馬斯接招這場不對等的戰爭無疑是非常愚蠢的；但是在巴勒斯坦的死亡人數中，除部分平民外， 其餘的多數是警察，而不是戰鬥人員。雖然西方軍隊和他們的敵人在阿富汗和伊拉克殺害了更多的平民；但是為了自己的利益以色列也應該減少殺戮，今天轟炸的巴 勒斯坦人將會是他永遠的鄰居。
This last point speaks to the test of effectiveness. Israel said at first that, much as it would like to topple Hamas, its present operation has the more limited aim of 「changing reality」 so that Hamas stops firing across the border. But as Israel learnt in Lebanon in 2006, this is far from easy. As with Hizbullah, Hamas』s 「resistance」 to Israel has made it popular and delivered it to power. It is most unlikely to bend the knee. Like Hizbullah, it will probably prefer to keep on firing no matter how hard it is hit, daring Israel to send its ground forces into a messy street fight in Gaza』s congested cities and refugee camps.
最後的這點是針對效能實驗說的。以色列最初表示希望推翻哈馬斯，同時也認為用軍事行動阻止哈馬斯向邊界對面發射火箭彈，力圖「改變現狀」的效果非常有限。 不過根據以色列從2006年黎巴嫩戰爭中的到教訓來看，這絕不是易事。在對待黎巴嫩真主黨的問題上，哈馬斯對以色列的「抵抗」讓該組織變得久負盛名並且威 力無窮；絕不會屈膝低頭。哈馬斯的態度像黎巴嫩真主黨一樣：只要以色列敢於向加沙地區擁擠的城鎮和難民營派出地面部隊，發動棘手的巷戰，該組織應該會不計 後果堅持戰鬥。
Now cease fire
現在就停火吧！
Can Israel have forgotten the lesson of Lebanon so soon? Hardly. If anything, its campaign against Hamas now is intended to compensate for its relative failure against Hizbullah then. With Iran』s nuclear threat on the horizon, and Iranian influence growing in both Lebanon and Gaza, Israel is keen to remind its enemies that the Jewish state can still fight and still win. Precisely for that reason, despite its talk of a long campaign, it may be more receptive than it is letting on to an immediate ceasefire. Its aircraft have already pummelled almost every target in Gaza. Further military gains will be harder. A truce now, if Hamas really did stop its fire, could be presented to voters as the successful rehabilitation of Israeli deterrence.
以色列能這麼快的忘記黎以戰爭的教訓嗎？只要以色列企圖用此次的巴以戰爭來彌補黎以戰爭時的失敗，就難以忘記。借助核武器的威脅，伊朗在加沙地區和以色列 的影響力與日俱增；而以色列卻熱切的希望提醒對手注意到猶太國家依然善戰並將取勝。就是因為這個原因，與急剎車似的停火相比，以色列把長期戰爭掛在嘴邊的 態度反而更加令人接受。以色列戰機幾乎數次襲擊了加沙地區的每一個目標，不過進一步的軍事意圖已經很難實現。如果哈馬斯可以真正停止襲擊，那麼當前真正意 義上的停火將讓選民看到以色列威懾力的成功復甦。
But a ceasefire needs a mediator. Mr Obama is not yet president, and George Bush has so far hung back, just as he did in 2006 while waiting for an Israeli knockout blow that did not come. This time, he and everyone else with influence should pile in at once. To bring Hamas on board, a ceasefire would need to include an end to Israel』s blockade, but that would be a good thing in itself, relieving the suffering in Gaza and removing one of the reasons Hamas gives for fighting.
不過停火需要一個斡旋人。奧巴馬目前還沒有入住白宮，而布什卻表現出退卻；一如他在2006年表現處得那樣，那時他在期待這以色列可以重拳出擊，但卻遲遲 沒有出現。此次，他和每一個有影響力的人應該適時出現。為了讓哈馬斯響應這次停火，以色列需要停止對巴勒斯坦的封鎖；而這本身對以色列也是一件好事情，因 為可以減輕加沙地區的痛苦並且減少哈馬斯發動襲擊的接口。
After that, Mr Obama will have to gather up what is left of diplomacy in the Middle East. It is not all hopeless. Until this week, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, was talking to Israel about how to create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. But Mr Abbas presides over the West Bank only, and little progress is possible so long as half of Palestine』s people support an organisation that can still not bring itself to renounce armed struggle or recognise Israel』s right to exist. Since Hamas is not going to disappear, some way must be found to change its mind. Bombs alone will never do that.
在此之後，奧巴馬將必須號召解決中東地區問題全部的外交可能，而且似乎還有一線希望。直到本周，巴勒斯坦總統阿巴斯一直在和以色列方面就在河西岸和加沙地 區建國的事情進行談判。但是阿巴斯只對河西岸負責，只要超過一半的巴勒斯坦人還支持哈馬斯，就基本上不存在取得進步的可能；因為該組織無法放放棄軍事鬥爭 或者承認以色列的生存權利。鑒於哈馬斯不會消失，必須設法改變他的想法；而單靠炸彈則永遠不會實現這個目的。
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